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of asset securitization. 
Steven L Schwarcz of Kaye Scholer Fierman Hays & Handler, New York, and 
Yale and Columbia universities, examines the benefits of asset 
securitization and how it enables companies to raise funds more cheaply. 
In recent years, asset securitization has become one of 
the most important financing vehicles in the us. Its use, 
however, is now rapidly expanding world-wide. 
Examples include the securitization of telephone and oil 
revenues in Mexico, of mortgages in the UK, of credit 
cards and consumer loans in France, and of leases 
inJapan. 
This article will explain asset securitization and its 
unique benefits. In particular, the article will explain 
why securitization enables many companies to raise 
funds at a lower cost than through traditional financing. 
How securitization works 
A company that wants to obtain financing through 
securitization begins by identifying assets that can be 
used to raise funds. These assets typically represent 
rights to payments at future dates and are usually 
referred to as receivables. The company that owns the 
receivables is usually called the originator. 
After identifying the assets to be used in the securiti-
zation, the originator transfers the receivables to a newly-
formed special purpose corporation, trust, or other legally 
separate entity - often referred to as a special purpose 
vehicle, or SPV. The transfer is intended to separate the 
receivables from risks associated with the originator. For 
this reason, the originator will often structure the transfer . 
so that it constitutes a true sale; that is, a sale that is suffi-
cient under bankruptcy or similar law to remove the 
receivables from the originator's bankruptcy estate. 
To raise funds to purchase these receivables, the SPV 
issues securities in the capital markets. The Spv, however, 
must be structured as bankruptcy remote to gain accep-
tance as an issuer of capital market securities. Bankruptcy 
remote in this context means that the SPV is unlikely to be 
adversely affected by a bankruptcy of the originator. 
To achieve bankruptcy remoteness, the SPV's organi-
zational structure strictly limits its permitted business 
activities. The goal is to prevent creditors (other than 
holders of the SPV's securities) from having claims against 
the SPV that might force the SPV into bankruptcy or 
insolvency. Furthermore, an SPV that is owned or 
controlled by the originator may be required to have one 
or more independent directors. The SPV must also 
attempt to observe all appropriate third party formalities 
with the originator. These additional steps help to reduce 
the risk that the originator, if bankrupt, will either cause 
the SPV to file for bankruptcy or persuade a court to use 
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equitable powers to consolidate the assets and liabilities 
of the SPV with those of the originator. 
How companies benefit from securitization 
Through the securitization process described above, the 
SPV raises funds by issuing securities and uses the 
receivables purchased from the originator to repay 
investors in the future. The investors, therefore, are 
concerned only with the cash flows coming due on these 
receivables, and care little about the originator's 
financial condition. 
Securitization is most valuable when the cost of 
funds, reflected in the interest rate that is necessary to 
entice investors to purchase the SPV's securities, is less 
than the cost of the originator's other, direct sources of 
funding. The SPV's lower cost of funds is passed on to 
the originator through a higher selling price for the origi-
nator's receivables. The goal of securitization, therefore, 
is to obtain low-cost capital market funding by 
separating all or a portion of an originator's receivables 
from the risks associated with the originator. 
The interest rate necessary to entice investors to 
purchase the SPV's securities is often a function of the 
rating that the SPV's debt securities receive. These 
ratings are determined by a handful of independent 
rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's. 
Given that most investors have neither the time nor the 
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resources to fully investigate the financial condition of· 
the companies in which they invest, these ratings take on 
special significance. Investors often rely on the assigned 
ratings to determine the minimum return that they will 
accept on a given investment. 
Companies whose debt securities are rated 
investment grade can usually issue securities in the 
capital markets at interest rates competitive with, or 
even lower than, other generally available sources of 
funds, such as bank loans. The higher the company's 
rating within the investment grade categories, the lower 
the company's cost of funds. This reduced cost is a result 
of the lower interest rate necessary to induce investors to 
buy the company's securities. 
A securitization transaction can provide obvious cost 
savings by permitting an originator whose debt securities 
are rated less than investment grade or whose securities 
are unrated to obtain funding through an SPV whose debt 
securities have an investment grade rating. Even an origi-
nator with an investment grade rating may derive benefit 
from securitization if the SPV can issue debt securities 
with a higher investment grade rating and, as a result, 
significantly decrease the originator's interest costs. 
One might expect securitization to be of greatest 
benefit to riskier companies. This, however, is only 
partly the case. As a company moves toward the 
extremes of financial instability and the brink of 
bankruptcy, securitization is less of a benefit. At this 
point, the SPV structure has a higher than normal risk of 
being challenged, and risk -averse investors tend to avoid 
these transactions. 
Asset securitization does, however, afford companies 
with acceptable risk levels the possibility of real cost 
savings. To determine whether an originator will achieve 
an overall cost savings from securitization, one must 
assess the interest savings possible against the costs of 
the securitization transaction. A company considering 
securitization should compare the expected differential 
between interest payable on non-securitized financing 
·and interest payable on securities issued by an applicable 
SPV with the expected difference in transaction costs 
between the alternative funding options. 
If, however, the securitization transaction is off 
balance sheet, a strict debt-to-debt comparison may 
understate securitization's benefits. Off-balance sheet 
securitization has its own inherent advantages because it 
does not put pressure on the originator to raise 
additional equity capital. Furthermore, whether or not 
the originator will achieve a cost saving partly depends 
on the way in which the originator structures the securi-
tization' because, as will be shown below, transaction 
costs can vary widely. 
One-off securitization structures 
In most securitization transactions, the SPV is created 
specifically for the particular originator and the 
particular transaction. The objective of this so-called 
one-off securitization is to provide the originator with 
significant flexibility to customize the securitization in 
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terms of its particular structure and the types of capital 
market securities issued. However, because one-off 
structures are created for a particular transaction, their 
transaction costs can be high; they can rarely achieve the 
transaction cost economies of scale realized by multi-
seller securitization conduits. 
In addition, to avoid subjecting the originator to the 
liabilities of a thinly-capitalized SPV, tax and accounting 
rules may require a minimum level of capital, such as 1 % 
to 3 % of the amount of the securities issued. In contrast, 
a multiseller securitization conduit should need only 
nominal capital because the multiplicity of sellers 
reduces the risk that the SPV will be regarded as the alter 
ego of anyone seller. Given these differences, only a 
case-by-case comparison of costs and other motivations 
will determine whether a one-off or multiseller structure 
is more advantageous to a particular originator. 
Originators desiring medium -or long -term financing 
can often access the capital markets through securitized 
private placement transactions. In these transactions, an 
SPV is created for a specific deal and issues medium-
term or long-term notes. A private placement takes 
advantage of the one-off structure because the private 
placement's requirements are determined primarily by 
the investors, who actively participate in analyzing the 
receivables and negotiating the structure of the deal with 
the originator. In addition, the investors' sophistication 
allows for a great deal of creativity in both the structure 
and type of receivables used. The SPV's securities only 
need to be rated if the investors so require. The interest 
rate on such securities may, however, be higher than 
normal because privately placed securities often cannot 
be freely traded. 
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Investment grade originators that have highly 
predictable receivables, or that obtain investment grade 
credit enhancement, may be able to offer long-term 
securities publicly through an SPV to investors in the 
capital markets. Because of the demand for publicly-
traded securities, this type of transaction would provide 
long-term financing with the lowest interest rate cost to 
the originator. 
The transaction costs of a public offering, however, 
are high. Not only must an SPV be created specifically 
for the financing, but it also must prepare and file a regis-
tration statement with the SEC or other applicable 
regulatory agency. In contrast to a private placement 
transaction, which can often be accomplished in a 
period of weeks, a public transaction can take months to 
accomplish. In addition, the level of due diligence 
required to satisfy governmental disclosure require-
ments can be daunting. For this reason, public securiti-
zation is rarely cost -effective for smaller transactions. 
The repayment of securities issued in one-off securiti-
zation structures is often guaranteed in whole or in part 
by creditworthy third parties in the business of assessing 
this kind of risk, such as banks or surety companies. The 
providers of these guarantees, often referred to as credit 
enhancement facilities, make independent decisions on 
whether to extend such enhancement and how much to 
charge for it. Although obtaining credit enhancement 
adds to transaction costs, the net effect may reduce total 
costs because secuntles supported by credit 
enhancement obtain higher credit ratings. As a result, 
the interest rate payable on such securities will be lower. 
Multisellersecuritizationconduits 
A multiseller securitization conduit offers originators 
the opportunity to minimize their transaction costs by 
utilizing a common SPV These conduits are typically 
administered by commercial or investment banks and 
are able to achieve a transaction cost economy of scale by 
allowing multiple originators to sell receivables to a 
single pre-existing SPV 
To date, most multiseller securitization conduits have 
accommodated only investment grade originators. This 
selectivity minimizes the risk - already rendered 
unlikely because of the bankruptcy remote structure -
that a single originator's bankruptcy might adversely 
affect a conduit engaged in transactions with many origi-
nators. However, a limited number of multiseller securi-
tization conduits have recently begun to serve origi-
nators whose debt securities are rated less than 
investment grade. As a result, more originators are now 
able to take advantage of the transaction cost economy 
of scale. 
Multiseller securitization conduits, like one-off struc-
tures, may benefit from credit enhancement. However, 
multiseller conduits usually issue short-term securities, 
such as commercial paper. Rating agencies will 
determine the ratings of such short -term securities based 
not only on the ultimate risk of default but also on the 
probability of timeliness of payment. As a result, rating 
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agencies often insist that creditworthy third parties 
ensure timely payment. Liquidity facilities help to assure 
that the multiseller conduit will have the liquidity 
available to meet short-term financial obligations in the 
event that cash flow from collections is temporarily 
insufficient. Providers of liquidity facilities are then 
repaid by collections on receivables when received. In 
most instances, the conduit will be able to pay maturing 
short-term debt securities through its collections on 
purchased receivables or by re-issuing commercial 
paper. Only when these sources are not sufficient to 
meet the conduit's short-term financial obligations will 
liquidity facilities need to be funded to assure the 
conduit of the necessary cash flow. 
The result is that multiseller securitization conduits 
typically utilize both liquidity facilities and credit 
enhancement. Providers ofliquidity facilities often insist 
that conduits obtain credit enhancement as well to 
emphasize that the liquidity facilities are ensuring only 
timeliness of payment and not guaranteeing against 
ultimate loss. They also may require credit enhancement 
if they are uncomfortable with the structure or the level 
of security of a given transaction. 
Because liquidity facilities and credit enhancement 
significantly reduce risk on securities issued by a multi-
seller conduit, rating agencies base their evaluations of 
such securities primarily on the liquidity and credit 
'enhancement facilities that the conduit obtains. 
Obtaining these facilities will, however, add to trans-
action costs, and their value in reducing interest costs 
must be adjusted accordingly. 
Indiredcostsand benefits 
The preceding sections discussed how variations in 
securitization structures can affect direct transaction 
costs and flexibility. Each structure is also associated 
with certain indirect costs and benefits. For example, 
transaction costs are not necessarily limited to direct 
expenses, such as fees for lawyers, investment bankers, 
and liquidity or credit enhancement facilities. They may 
also arise from the true sale requirement. 
To achieve a true sale, an originator must sometimes 
limit, if not forgo, its right to the residual value of the 
receivables sold to the Spv. This residual value can be 
significant since the SPV must obtain a level of receiv-
ables well in excess of the amount necessary to pay the 
securities issued by the spv. Such over-collateralization 
is needed to assure investors and providers of liquidity 
and credit enhancement that they will not suffer losses 
from delayed collection or defaults. Conflict may develop 
over the amount of over-collateralization necessary for the 
SPV: originators want the level of over-collateralization to 
be low, while investors and credit enhancers want it to be 
high. Because the amount of receivables sold may turn 
out to be greater than what was needed to pay the SPV's 
securities, the overpayment would represent an indirect, 
but real, cost to the originator. 
The cost of over-collateralization can be managed in 
several ways. If the originator's rating is investment 
International Financial Law Review 
grade, it can sometimes structure the transfer of receiv-
ables to the SPV as a sale for accounting but not neces-
sarily bankruptcy purposes. After the SPV pays off its 
securities, the excess receivables and collections can 
then be returned to the originator without altering the 
original accounting characterization of the transaction 
as a sale. 
The indirect benefits of securitization will often more 
than compensate for its indirect costs. One of the most 
important indirect benefits is that asset securitization 
provides a source of off-balance sheet funding. Because 
a securitization is usually viewed, for accounting 
purposes, as a sale of assets and not as financing, the 
originator does not record the transaction as a liability 
on its balance sheet. Such off-balance sheet funding thus 
raises capital without increasing the originator's leverage 
or debt -to-equity ratio on its financial statements. 
Another benefit of asset securitization is that it may 
represent an additional and untapped source of 
financing for an originator. Sometimes originators will 
find that investor appetite for their securities has 
become temporarily sated. In other words, the amount 
of originator risk exposure that the capital markets are 
prepared to accept may be less than the amount of 
capital market financing desired by the originator. In 
these cases, securitization permits the originator to 
obtain additional capital market funding through an 
SPV. 
Certain securitizations may also result in a lower-
weighted average interest rate to the originator through 
the use of a senior! subordinate securities structure at the 
SPV level. Sophisticated investors provide the equiv-
alent of credit enhancement to the SPV by purchasing 
subordinated securities. The originator thereby 
allocates certain repayment risks to these investors, who 
are in the business of assessing and accepting such risks 
and who consequently are willing to accept a higher level 
of risk than the average investor. The interest rate on 
these subordinated securities would be higher than the 
interest rate on the non-subordinated (or senior) 
securities to compensate for the greater risk. 
Nonetheless, this combination of senior and subordi-
nated securities will still be of benefit to the originator if, 
as is usually the case, the resulting blended interest rate 
on the combined securities is lower than the rate that 
would have been applicable if only one class of securities 
had been issued. 
The senior/subordinate structure can also be used to 
expand the universe of parties available to provide credit 
enhancement. An entity providing external credit 
enhancement in the form of a guarantee or its equivalent 
is usually required to have a credit rating at least equal to 
that of the securities being guaranteed. However, the 
number of highly-rated credit enhancers - including 
banks - is relatively small. 
Securitization distinguished from factoring 
Traditionally used throughout the world, factoring, like 
securitization, entails a sale of receivables to generate 
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cash. Given the superficial similarities between the two 
financing techniques, it is useful to compare them and 
consider when each applies. 
In a factoring transaction the factor is typically a pre-
existing finance company which realizes its profits by 
buying receivables from clients at a discount. 
Securitization, in contrast, usually involves the creation of 
a bankruptcy-remote SPV which purchases receivables 
from the originator and issues asset-backed securities into 
the capital markets. Whereas factors rely on their 
specialized knowledge of collection to reduce their risk of 
loss, the SPV minimizes its risk through the purchase of 
quality receivables with predictable rates of default. The 
differences between securitization and factoring, however, 
are not rigid and begin to blur in certain instances. For 
example, there are fewer differences between securiti-
zation and factoring in transactions where an SPVborrows 
funds from non-capital market sources instead of issuing 
securities, or where a factor funds itself through the 
issuance of capital market securities. 
In certain circumstances, the principles used in 
securitization and factoring may be combined to obtain 
even lower cost funding than through either conven-
tional securitization or traditional factoring. For 
example, small and medium-size companies may be able 
to benefit from structures, such as the divisible interest 
structure, that provide capital market funding without 
the extra cost of creating an intermediary Spv. 
In the divisible interest structure, an originator would 
sell, for a negotiated fixed price, its rights in a pool of 
receivables equal to 100% of all collections up to a trigger 
point. Once fixed, there is no adjustment to the purchase 
price, irrespective of actual collections, and because the 
transfer is directly from the originator of the receivables 
to the issuer of the securities, there is no need to create an 
intermediary SPV, as in the two-tier structure. 
Thus, the divisible interest structure permits multiple 
originators to pool their receivables in a single securiti-
zation and thereby achieve economies of scale. It also 
reduces the transaction costs of a two-tier structure. 
Therefore, the combination of concepts from securiti-
zation and factoring can lead to innovative and syner-
gistic structures and approaches. 
Does securitization reduce netfinancing costs? 
A zero-sum game is one in which one person's benefit. 
exactly offsets another person's loss, so that the net 
payoff of the entire game is zero. Is securitization a zero-
sum game, or does it create a genuine cost reduction for 
parties? 
We have seen that, despite its transaction costs, 
securitization can be less expensive than other funding 
sources because it enables originators to obtain low-cost 
capital market funding. Even investment grade origi-
nators who already have direct access to capital market 
funding may prefer securitization because of its indirect 
benefits, such as the provision of off-balance sheet 
funding. Although indirect benefits are harder to 
quantify, many companies that use securitization are 
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investment grade. This tact is. significant when. one 
considers that profit-maximizing companies generally 
do not engage in activities whose benefits are illusory. 
These observations leave unanswered, however, the 
question of whether securitization enables originators to 
realize a gain at the expense of others, such as the origi-
nator's unsecured general creditors. For example, some 
critics have argued that unsecured creditors are harmed 
by securitization because it reduces the amount of the 
originator's unencumbered assets available for debt 
repayment. This argument is flawed, however; securiti-
zation merely replaces one type of asset, receivables, 
with another type, cash. The unsecured creditor has the 
same amount of unencumbered assets to levy against 
after the securitization as it did before the securitization. 
Other critics have argued that cash raised in securiti-
zation is unlikely to stay within the originator. However, 
one cannot assume wasteful behaviour simply because 
an originator sells its receivables for cash. In fact, given 
the scrutiny imposed by rating agencies and other 
independent parties such as credit enhancers, securiti-
zation may present fewer opportunities for self-dealing 
than other financing methods. Nonetheless, securiti-
zation, just like any other sale of assets by an originator, 
may become suspect if implemented when an originator 
is on the brink of bankruptcy. An originator, for 
example, may be seeking to convert receivables into cash 
to make preferential payments to certain creditors or 
even to fraudulently hide assets. 
The potential for such suspect actions, however, is not 
unique to securitization transactions. The same issues 
would arise, for example, if on the eve of bankruptcy an 
originator sold, or borrowed money by encumbering, a 
factory or equipment and similarly sought to dissipate the 
sale or loan proceeds. Such questionable uses of proceeds 
are more appropriately addressed by preference and 
fraudulent conveyance laws, or other laws which seek to 
ensure equality of distribution of a debtor's estate. 
The question nonetheless remains: does securitization 
genuinely reduce net financing costs? A securitization 
provides a new source of financing - the capital markets, 
whose rates are systematically lower than the rates at 
which non-investment grade firms commonly borrow. 
Prior to engaging in a securitization, an originator may be 
financing itself through secured and unsecured loans. 
After the securitization, the originator raises funds by 
accessing the capital markets through the SPV 
The transformation from loan financing to capital 
market funding with its comparatively lower interest 
rate thus can reduce net financing costs. So long as the 
added transaction costs are less than the interest saved 
by using securitization instead ofloan financing, securi-
tization can create a net gain. 
But why should the capital markets be prepared to 
fund securitization transactions at a lower rate than 
secured financing? One explanation is that securiti-
zation serves as a means of reducing monitoring costs. 
Because the interest rate on a loan is determined when 
theloan is made, a borrower may take actions that increase 
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the loan's riskiness after the loan is made. A creditor will 
incur certain monitoring costs as a result to ensure that the 
borrower's actions do not increase the riskiness of the 
loan. Even secured financing may not reduce the need to 
monitor the borrower's financial condition. If the secured 
creditor's ability to exercise remedies against the collateral 
could be impaired by a bankruptcy; a secured creditor will 
have a significant interest in ensuring the continued 
viability of the borrower and will incur monitoring costs 
to further that interest in addition to the costs of 
monitoring the collateral. 
In a securitization, on the other hand, the originator's 
receivables are sold to a bankruptcy remote SPV in a true 
sale. Consequently, a bankruptcy of the originator 
would not adversely affect the ability of investors to 
receive payment on their asset-backed securities. 
Because a bankruptcy-remote structure separates the 
source of payment of the SPV's securities from the risks 
associated with the originator, the need to monitor the 
originator's financial condition is largely eliminated. 
Although the risks associated with servicing and 
collecting the receivables still necessitate some 
monitoring, these risks can be borne by providers of 
credit enhancement or investors in subordinated 
securities, parties who are in the business of precisely 
assessing and absorbing such risks. By causing the SPV 
to issue a combination of senior securities to ordinary 
capital market investors and subordinated securities to 
sophisticated investors, an originator can minimize the 
effect of asymmetric information among investors and 
thereby obtain a lower blended interest rate and 
therefore lower credit costs. Credit enhancement 
minimizes the effect of asymmetric information among 
investors through the use of highly rated institutions that 
wish to profit by guaranteeing all or a portion of the 
securities issued to investors. 
Conclusion 
In many cases, securitization not only reduces an origi-
nator's direct financing costs but also provides signif-
icant indirect benefits. Securitization entails real costs, 
however, and therefore should only be used after 
comparison with alternative sources of funding. In the 
international arena, there may be additional issues, such 
as dealing with foreign currency exchange, tax, apd 
sovereignty considerations, as well as legal systems that 
may not always be focused on asset-based financing. 
Nonetheless, securitization has only been applied to a 
portion of its potential market opportunities. It 
therefore promises to be a financing technique that will 
continue to grow. Securitization, in short, brings to 
financial technology what the sought-after philosopher's 
stone promised to bring to base metals - the ability to 
turn them into gold. a 
This article is based on The Alchemy of Asset 
Securitization which was originally published in the 
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance, and is 
being used by permission of the Board of Trustees of 
Stanford University. 
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